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Abstract
Drawing on a database tracking the career of 1,250 top Chinese executives from 
1,084 publicly-listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this article analyzes differ-
ences in career incentives for subsidiaries controlled by the central government 
compared to those controlled by local governments. It also considers the differ-
ences for executives in listed companies close to the parent group compared to 
those that are heads in distant subsidiaries. We ﬁnd that in both SOEs and their 
publicly listed subsidiaries, administrative experience or political connections 
appear to increase the likelihood of promotion. However, in the case of central 
SOE subsidiaries, leaders are more likely to be promoted based on ﬁnancial 
performance.  For both central and local 'direct' SOE groups age is a signiﬁcant 
negative factor for promotion, whereas tenure is a signiﬁcant positive factor.
Keywords: China, state-owned enterprises, Chinese business executives, career incen-
tives, economic performance, iron triangle
Introduction1
Prior to China's economic reform and opening up, the industrial 
economy was almost entirely state-owned. But despite the emer-
gence of a dynamic private sector (Naughton 1996; Lardy 2014), 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have not withered away. The 
market now ofﬁcially plays a 'decisive' role in resource allocation, 
but public ownership remains the ideological foundation of the 
Chinese economy, according to the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee's 2013 Decision on Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (Communist Party of China 
2013).2 China's largest companies, which dominate key economic 
sectors, are SOEs (Hubbard & Williams 2016). SOEs are also the 
largest Chinese investors abroad.3 
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On the surface many of these companies have adopted Anglo-Ameri-
can corporate governance forms and have publicly-listed subsidiaries. 
However, their controlling shareholder is the Chinese government, and 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) plays a key role in choosing their 
executives. Who are the leaders of these companies? How are they ap-
pointed? What do their career paths look like, and what are their career 
incentives? Do they behave like business leaders, or are they more like 
Party-state bureaucrats?
This article draws on a database tracking the careers of 1250 top 
executives (CEO, board chairman and Party Secretary) from 1084 pub-
licly-listed SOEs from 2003 to 2012. It considers differences in career 
incentives for subsidiaries of SOEs controlled by the central government 
(yang qi) compared to those controlled by local governments (guo qi), as 
well as between listed SOEs that are close to the top of corporate groups 
and those that are distant subsidiaries. 
The Iron Triangle: Party, State and Business
SOEs are no longer mere 'workshops' of the China's state planning ap-
paratus. By and large they have adopted corporate forms inspired by 
Anglo-American corporate governance. Many have partially-privatized 
subsidiaries listed on sharemarkets in China and abroad. But formal 
governance structures do not necessarily translate to the substantive 
proﬁt-seeking behaviour expected of privately-owned enterprises. 
Their controlling shareholder (the Chinese State) has myriad economic 
and political objectives, and their human resources function for top 
management is managed by the CPC. This creates an 'iron triangle' of 
mutually supportive relationships between the state, Party, and busi-
ness (Brødsgaard 2012). These relationships are structured by the Party 
and form the core of the Chinese power system. If the 'iron triangle' is 
broken, the system will change, possibly resulting in the collapse of 
CPC domination.
The state, Party and business are at the corners of a triangle, but the 
boundaries between them are not strictly deﬁned. Different formal re-
lationships between state and business at various levels can resemble 
a matrix muddle. 
An overview of the essential elements and relations between owner-
ship and governance in state and private business is provided in Figure 
2, which distinguishes ﬁve discreet categories ranging from purely state, 
to state-owned enterprises, to state-controlled enterprises and private- 
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FIGURE 1. The Chinese Iron Triangle: Relationships between the 
Party, State and Business
controlled mixed capital and purely private investors. Within these we 
can identify different types of enterprises or corporate forms that carry 
out business activity.  Party organizations run parallel to these at all 
levels, although the role of the Party varies.
State Organs
The State Council of the People's Republic of China is the highest execu-
tive organ of the Chinese central government. It oversees all state min-
istries, commissions and administrations. Since 2003 the State Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the 
State Council has been responsible for managing central SOEs. Certain 
sectors, such as ﬁnance, tobacco and media, are owned and controlled 
by other state ministries. The Chinese government also controls other 
assets through its sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds 
(Cummine 2015).4
China's provinces, autonomous regions and provincial-level munici-
palities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin) are subordinate to 
the central government. Each of these provincial-level governments 
has its own SASAC, which oversees provincial SOEs. Provinces and 
municipalities oversee hundreds of lower-ranked counties and other 
administrative districts with their own SASACs, which in turn oversee 
thousands of 'local' SOEs.
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Public education and social welfare functions are provided directly 
by state institutions and organisations at central, provincial and local 
levels (box A in Figure 2).
The Party's Role within the State
The Party completely dominates state organs. It sets the policy direction 
for state bodies which the state in turn executes. The Party not only makes 
key personnel appointments to the state, but also ensures that key state 
appointments, such as to the State Council and provincial leadership, 
overlap with Party organs up to the highest level. Political relationships 
are therefore linked to promotion prospects for Chinese state ofﬁcials. 
A general literature addressing the ofﬁcial promotions can be divided 
into three schools. One school argues that political connectedness and 
patronage relationships determine the possibility of promotion (Shih, 
Adolph & Liu 2012; Chen 2006). Another school holds that economic 
performance increases the likelihood of promotion (Li & Zhou 2005; 
Landry 2008; Yao 2016). A third contends that economic performance 
matters more as a factor for promotion at lower levels of government, 
whereas political connectedness matters more at the central level (Choi 
2012; Landry, Lü & Duan 2014).5
State-owned Enterprises
In the classical socialist econo0my, there was no distinction between the 
workshop (production unit) and the state itself, and so pre-reform state-
owned enterprises can be thought of as an integrated part of the state 
(Kornai 1992). With the reform and marketization of the Chinese economy, 
most productive sectors of the economy were spun-off from the state. 
Beginning with experimentation in October 1978, separate enterprises 
were created that were distinct from − though still highly dependent on 
− the state (Wu 2005: 145).  This could be at a small scale, but sometimes 
it involved the wholesale conversion of entire government ministries. 
Most state-owned enterprises today can therefore be traced back to 
bureaux within ministries. 
Some were converted wholesale from entire ministries. China's 
three oil giants were formed to take over the assets of the Ministry of 
Petroleum – China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in 
1982, China National Petroleum Corporation (Sinopec) in 1983 and 
China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation (CNPC) in 
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1988. These new corporations not only took over the ministry's assets 
and enterprise functions, but replaced its administrative functions too 
(Brødsgaard 2012;  Zhang 2004).
Today, state-owned enterprises are overseen by state organs, but are 
no longer formally part of the state. Technically, a SOE is a wholly-state 
owned, non-corporate entity registered according to Regulation of the 
People's Republic of China on the Registration of Enterprises and Corpora-
tions (box B). State agencies and SOEs can also hold shares in 'solely 
state-funded limited liability corporations (LLCs)'. LLCs are registered 
according to the Regulations for the Administration of Company Registration 
and have between two and 50 shareholders (box C).6
The largest and most important SOEs, the so-called central enterprises, 
are managed by the SASAC of the State Council (Brødsgaard 2012). 
There are now 106 of these companies, which are also known as China's 
national champions as they include China's largest and most important 
companies (Hubbard & Williams 2016) including in energy, resources 
and public utilities (Hubbard 2016a). Provincial and local governments' 
SASACs oversee thousands of local SOEs that are small and typically 
involved in more competitive sectors of the economy, but these can still 
be relatively large and important within their province. 
Central SOE leaders are subject to three-year performance contracts 
from the central SASAC. Performance standards relate to ﬁnancial 
indicators of the ﬁrm, including growth in revenue and proﬁtability. 
SOE leaders are graded between A to E based on these standards and 
receive corresponding ﬁnancial bonuses. 
Party Role within State-owned Enterprises
State-owned enterprises all have a Party Committee with a clear man-
date from the Party Constitution. A party organization in a state owned 
enterprise
guarantees and oversees the implementation of the principles and 
policies of the Party and the state in [the]… enterprise and backs the 
meeting of shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors 
and manager (factory director) in the exercise of their functions and 
powers according to law (Xinhua 2013).7
Alongside this formal arrangement, there is a convention that the Chair-
man of the Board of Directors (where there is one) or the general manager 
concurrently holds the position of Secretary of the SOE's Party Committee. 
As the Chairman of the Board is normally regarded as the top person (diyi 
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bashou) in the company, this rule consolidates the Party's dominant role. 
Directives on SOE reform from September 2015 stress the leading role of 
the Party in SOE governance through this arrangement, even though the 
thrust of the reform is to insulate enterprise decisions and governance 
from formal state control (Communist Party of China 2015).8
There have been several attempts to abolish administrative ranking 
for central SOEs. As early as 2000, the Party passed a plan for deepen-
ing the reform of cadre personnel work, stipulating that administrative 
ranking for enterprises should be abolished (Zhonggong zhongyang 
bangongting).9 Subsequently, the issue has resurfaced frequently but 
SOE leaders have been opposed to these attempts and still consider 
themselves to hold vice-ministerial rank (Suo 2014).10 In short, admin-
istrative rank for SOE executives has been formally abolished, but in 
practice it still exists.
The leaders of the 53 most important central SOEs are directly ap-
pointed by the Party's Central Organization Department according 
to the nomenklatura system which handles appointments at or above 
vice-ministerial level (Brødsgaard 2012). They therefore enjoy high po-
litical status and social inﬂuence in the Chinese rank-stratiﬁed political 
order. A very small number of SOE heads enjoy even higher status in a 
Party capacity as members or alternate members of the Party's Central 
Committee. Other central SOE leaders are appointed by SASAC, sub-
ject to the central organization department's veto. They are ranked at 
departmental level (ju/si or ting). 
Provincial SOE heads are ranked at a much lower level (equivalent 
to that of a deputy mayor of a prefectural level city, such as Suzhou). 
Heads of county SOEs are ranked even lower. They are responsible 
to the SASAC of the provincial government (or a branch of SASAC at 
county-level), and appointments are controlled by the local party ap-
paratus rather than the central Government.
In an Anglo-American corporate model, members of a company 
board have a ﬁduciary duty to act in the interests of the company. A 
failure to do so may be punished by a general meeting of shareholders, 
which can ultimately determine the fate of the company leadership.  By 
contrast, while the leaders of SOEs do have an interest in the ﬁnancial 
performance of the SOE (including the performance pay from SASAC), 
their longer term career prospects are embedded in Party structures. 
If their personal ambitions go beyond running one of China's largest 
companies, then they need to obtain higher political rank by shifting 
career track to a government or Party position. This leaves open the 
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chance of attaining ministerial rank and postponing retirement by ﬁve 
years. This career shift is determined by the central Party, rather than 
the SOE or its nominal state owner. 
There are three post-CEO pathways. One is lateral transfer from CEO 
or Chairman of a SASAC company to a Party or government position in 
a province or municipality. Individuals following this pathway will nor-
mally be transferred to a position as vice governor or deputy provincial 
or municipal Party secretary. Another pathway is lateral transfer from 
executive leadership of a central enterprise to a government or Party 
position at the central level, at vice-ministerial level. Although, lateral 
transfer from one vice-ministerial position in a company to a similar 
ranked position in government is not strictly a promotion, we regard it 
as such because the transfer opens the door for further career advance-
ment along the civil servant track. A less common third pathway is direct 
promotion to a ministerial level within the central government.
The career incentives of SOE leaders are yet to be studied in English-
language academic literature. The leading study in Chinese, Yang, Wang 
and Nie (2013), considers factors affecting the career movements of 189 
leaders of central SOEs between 2008-2011. They ﬁnd that increased 
economic performance (measured by growth of operating revenue) 
increases the chance of promotion. They also ﬁnd that leaders who are 
members of the Party's Central Committee, and those that hold a PhD 
degree, have higher promotion prospects. They conclude that central 
SOE heads are 'quasi-government ofﬁcials' rather than professional 
managers because their SASAC-determined performance pay has no 
signiﬁcant link to promotion.
The career paths of executives in SOE subsidiaries are also yet to be 
systematically researched. But it is important since these large corporate 
structures can provide an environment for aspiring SOE leaders to work 
their way up from lower-level subsidiaries. Most leaders within central 
SOE conglomerates advance through their own company on the basis of 
what could be called a single-group career track, where they typically 
start their career from a subsidiary and then move to the parent com-
pany. Another career path is a multi-group career track where business 
executives have work experience in SOEs in the same industry.
There are ten current leaders of central SASAC SOEs whom we ob-
serve having previous positions in listed lower-level subsidiaries. One 
of these, Xu Lejiang, is Chairman and Party Secretary of Baosteel Group 
Corporation and the head of its listed subsidiary Baoshan Iron & Steel 
Co., Ltd., and an alternate member of the 17th and 18th Central Com-
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mittee. Others became leaders in the SASAC parent after experience in 
listed subsidiaries within the same industry, if not the same SOE:
• Ma Zehua, a former leader in the Shanghai-listed Cosco Shipping 
Company Limited, became Chairman of the Board and Party Secre-
tary of the China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company after July 2013. 
Xu Lirong, also a prior leader in the Shanghai-listed subsidiary, took 
over Mr Ma's roles in the parent in January 2016.11     
• The General Manager and Deputy Party Secretary of China Huaneng 
Group, Cao Peixi, was previously Chairman of Huadian Power In-
ternational Corporation Limited. He is also a delegate to the 16th, 
17th and 18th CPC National Congress, and a member of the 18th 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. 
• Huang Yongda was a leader in Shanghai-listed Huaneng Power 
International, INC. (a subsidiary of China Huaneng Group) be-
fore becoming Party Secretary and General Manager at Huaneng 
Group.
• Li Qingkui, currently Chairman and Party Secretary China Huadian 
Corporation (CHD), was previously a leader in Shenzhen-listed 
Guodian Changyuan Electric Power Company.
• Chen Esheng is Chairman and Party Secretary of Sinolight Corpora-
tion and was previously a leader at its Shenzhen-listed subsidiary, 
China Haisum Engineering Co., Ltd.
• Fu Yuning is Chairman and Party Secretary of China Resources 
(Huirun Group) and was previously Chairman of Shenzhen-Listed 
China International Marine Containers (Group) Co.
• Wen Gang is General Manager at China North Industries Group 
Corporation (NORINCO) and was previously a top executive at 
Shenzhen-listed SNC OPTO Electronic Co Ltd, an LED exporter. 
• Rui Xiaowu was Chairman and Party Secretary of China Electronics 
Corporation and was previously a leader at Shenzhen-listed NavInfo 
– at NORINCO.
State-Controlled Enterprises
Many of the companies commonly referred to as SOEs are not strictly 
state-owned enterprises at all by the above deﬁnitions. They can be more 
accurately described as 'state-holding' or 'state-controlled' enterprises. 
These are not SOEs, but separate corporate entities, joint ventures and 
partnerships in which an SOE or another state-controlled enterprise has 
the largest capital share. This can include enterprises that are wholly-
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owned or majority-owned by SOEs, or even minority-owned provided 
that there is no larger non-state shareholder. 
Table 1 shows basic statistics for SOEs in China's industrial 
sectors.12 These show the breakdown of 9,535 'ﬁrst tier' SOEs in 
the industrial sector between central SASAC, other ministries and 
local governments in 2009. Beyond this are 15,861 direct subsidiar-
ies (second tier state-controlled enterprises) and subsidiaries of 
these subsidiaries (third tier subsidiaries). Central SOEs are often 
sprawling corporate conglomerates. In total, central industrial 
SOEs and their second- and third-tier subsidiaries employ 7.7 mil-
lion workers. By contrast, local SOEs employ almost 10 million 
workers, but have on average only one or two subsidiaries and 
are also much smaller in terms of assets.
TABLE 1. Industrial SOEs and their subsidiaries, 2009
First tier To third Tier Employees
End of year state 
assets (million RMB)
Industrial SOES 10125 36618 18,445,000 7,340,980
of which, Central 
Government
590 11222 8,464,000 5,057,120
Central SASAC 56 10442 7,734,000 4,258,180
Other Ministries 534 780 730,000 798,990
of which, Local 
Government
9535 25396 9,981,000 2,283,860
Source: SASAC Yearbook 2010
Some of these SOE subsidiaries are shareholding corporations that are 
publicly listed on Chinese or international sharemarkets (box D). This 
makes them 'partially privatised' through the involvement of private 
Chinese and foreign investors. Their shareholders can include other 
SOEs, their subsidiaries, as well as China's largely state-owned ﬁnan-
cial institutions. One motivation is to attract external capital, another 
is an attempt to improve economic performance through independent 
external oversight of proﬁt-seeking investors. 
Public listing of large SOE subsidiaries was a policy initiative from the 
late 1990s. For example, a decade after being created from the state oil 
ministry in 1988, CNPC's core assets in extraction, reﬁning, chemical and 
retailing were restructured into a subsidiary called 'PetroChina' which 
was then listed on Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges in March 
2000 (Wu 2005: 156–157). The wholly-state-owned central SOE retains 
an 87 per cent ownership share in this subsidiary (see Figure 3).
SOE subsidiaries, and even their subsidiary companies, can also be 
listed. For example, Tongrentang, a traditional Chinese medicine com-
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FIGURE 3. A directly-controlled, central SOE subsidiary
State Council SASAC
China National Petroleum 
Corporation (Unlisted, ﬁrst-
tier SOE)
100% owns
PetroChina Company 
Limited (Listed, second-tier 
SOE)
87% owns
pany, was founded in the 1669 during the Qing dynasty. The China 
Beijing Tongrentang Group is today a wholly-owned subsidiary of a 
capital management company that sits directly under Beijing municipal-
ity SASAC. The Tongrentang Group owns a majority stake in Beijing 
Tongrentang Shareholding Ltd which is listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (Figure 4).
FIGURE 4. An indirectly-controlled, local SOE subsidiary
Beijing Municipality SASAC
Beijing State-owned Capital 
Operation and Management 
Center (Unlisted, ﬁrst tier 
SOE)
China Beijing Tongrentang 
Group (Unlisted, second-tier 
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Beijing Tongrentang 
Shareholding Ltd (Listed, 
third-tier SOE)
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100% owns
100% owns
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These are simpliﬁed, stylized examples. Tracing ownership of listed 
Chinese companies takes hours of painstaking work for each company. 
Central SOE China National Chemical Corporation (ChinaChem) has at 
least nine listed subsidiaries (including 17 interspersed companies and 
a joint venture with Guangzhou City SASAC) (Rooker 2016a).13 Bright 
Foods, which is ultimately owned by Shanghai SASAC, has direct and 
indirect interests in ﬁve listed subsidiaries (Rooker 2016b). 14The larg-
est central SOE conglomerates have an average of 185 second and third 
tier subsidiaries.
A condition of listing on a stock exchange is the need to report de-
tailed corporate information to inform current and potential sharehold-
ers. This data is readily used for research, including this article. As of 
May 2016, Google Scholar lists 51 research report results for a search 
on 'publicly listed SOEs' relating to China. However, data on 'listed 
SOEs' does not reﬂect what might go on the balance sheet of the parent 
SOE and its other unlisted subsidiaries; as such,  care needs to be taken 
when drawing inferences from publicly-listed SOE subsidiaries to the 
state sector as a whole.
Outside listed SOE subsidiaries for which ownership information is on 
the public record, there are thousands of joint ventures, limited liability 
companies, partnerships and shareholding corporations which may 
have any degree of state ownership. All large scale industrial enterprises 
provide information through annual statistical returns to the National 
Bureau of Statistics that are widely used by researchers (Brandt, Van 
Biesebroeck & Zhang 2014). These data can identify state-controlled 
enterprises, and the level at which the company is supervised, but does 
not identify the controlling owner.
One of the ways that a state-owned enterprise (or its subsidiary) has 
to control its subsidiary is to ensure overlapping management positions 
between the state-owned parent and the publicly-listed subsidiary. A 
survey of 109 listed companies cited by Fu (2013), found that 80 per 
cent of chairmen in central listed SOE's subsidiaries are senior execu-
tives of the unlisted parent. In the following, we will present empirical 
evidence for factors inﬂuencing the careers of leaders of listed SOE-
subsidiaries.
Private-controlled Mixed Capital
The state, state-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises can 
also contribute capital to private-controlled enterprises. These could 
be enterprises that were previously state-owned enterprises but have 
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been partially-privatized to the extent that that the largest shareholder 
is now private. These can be through publicly listed companies (box F), 
or through all kinds of unlisted public-private partnerships, joint ven-
tures and other mixed arrangements with private domestic or foreign 
investors (box G).
Finally, there are truly private enterprises with which the state has 
no ownership relationship whatsoever. Many of the unlisted private-
controlled companies also fall into this category, but they cannot be 
deﬁnitively identiﬁed from the available statistics, although some 
enterprises are registered as solely private- or foreign- funded, or are 
self-employed private individuals. 
Party Role within Private Enterprises
The Party has a role in mixed ownership and fully private enterprises. 
The Companies Law of the People's Republic of China makes it explicit that 
'grass roots organizations of the Communist Party' (including Party 
committees) are allowed to carry out their activities in companies (even 
foreign companies) in accordance with the Party Constitution. Report-
edly 'all 210,000 large private companies' now have Party Committees 
and have recruited more than 3.5 million workers (Xinhua 2012).15 Nev-
ertheless, their mandate is weaker than in state-owned enterprises. In a 
private enterprise, the Party Committee is meant to 'guide and oversee 
the enterprise in observing (state) laws and regulations.' It comes with a 
pro-business rider that the Committee 'stimulates the healthy develop-
ment of the enterprise' (Hawes 2007).16
Thus even complete independence from state ownership does not 
rule out business-Party links. However, although the Party has had 
individual private entrepreneurs as members since 2002, less than 
1 per cent of individually owned enterprises (getihu) have Party Com-
mittees  (Xinhua 2012).
Career Incentives for Leaders of Listed SOE Subsidiaries
We have already noted previous studies of career incentives for state 
ofﬁcials, and heads of central state-owned enterprises. We have noted 
that SOEs provide a career track to ofﬁcial positions.  But who are the 
leaders of these companies? How are they appointed, what do their 
career paths look like, and what are their career incentives? Do they 
behave like business leaders, or are they more like Party-state bureau-
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crats? The answers to these questions not only inform our understand-
ing of the 'iron triangle', but also have implications for the efﬁciency 
of state capital. If state assets are managed by professional business-
men, who are rewarded for ﬁnancial performance and are at arms' 
length from the state, then SOE company performance matches that of 
professionally-managed private companies. By contrast, if state assets 
are managed by 'quasi-ofﬁcials', then the ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance 
is more likely to be impaired by the 'soft budget constraint syndrome' 
and policy burdens (Kornai, Maskin & Roland 2003; Lin & Tan 1999) 
that impair company performance.
We investigate this issue using a database of 1,241 executive move-
ments between 2003 and 201217 for leaders in state-controlled companies 
listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange and quoted in RMB 
(that is 'A' shares). Detailed ﬁnancial information of listed companies was 
obtained from GTA Information Technology. Biographical information 
was hand-collected from annual reports, company announcements and 
other publicly-available ofﬁcial company documents. Supplementary 
information was taken from the web portal Sina Finance (Xinlang Cai-
jing), corporate websites and SASAC websites. A detailed description 
of this dataset and the preliminary ﬁndings have been published in 
Chinese (Zhang, Liu & Cai 2015). 
Listed companies are classiﬁed according to whether the ultimate 
owner is administered by the central government, a province or a county. 
We divide listed companies into two groups: those that are directly 
administered by the state or by an SOE (that is, ﬁrst- and second-tier 
companies) and those that are more than two steps removed from the 
state parent (third-tier down to ninth-tier in our sample). We consider 
that the further down the chain of listed subsidiaries, the more the lead-
ership is to be insulated from political demands (Fan, Wong & Zhang 
2013; Zhongming 2010).18 Table 2 shows the distribution of executive 
movements according to the classiﬁcation of the listed SOE subsidiary.
Firstly, we consider the question of where leaders of listed SOE sub-
sidiaries have career tracks that go beyond strictly business, and include 
outside political or work connections. Yang et al (2013) focused on 
Central Committee membership as an indicator of political connections 
for central SOE heads. Because we are considering SOE subsidiaries at 
central and provincial levels, we need broader measures of connections. 
In this case, we deﬁne a political role as being a representative to the 
National or a provincial People's Congress, or Committee member of 
the national or a provincial Political Consultative Conference. We also 
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TABLE 2. Executive movements by company type and level 
Type Indirect Total
County 64 216 280
% 22.86 77.14 100
Provincial 161 330 491
% 32.79 67.21 100
Central 334 136 470
% 71.06 28.94 100
Total 559 682 1,241
% 45.04 54.96 100
include prior work experience as a government ofﬁcial or in another 
public enterprise.
Table 3 indicates that more than a third of leaders of listed SOE sub-
sidiaries have this type of experience. The proportion is slightly higher 
TABLE 3. Leaders with external political links and administrative 
experience
Chain
Local
Central Provincial County Total
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Direct
(0,2) N 89 47 200 130 129 87 418 264
% 65.4 34.6 60.6 39.4 59.7 40.3 61.3 38.7
Indirect
(3,6) N 236 94 119 42 42 22 397 158
% 71.5 28.5 73.9 26.1 65.6 34.4 48.7 37.2
(6,9) N 1 3 -- -- -- -- 1 0
% 25.0 75.0 -- -- -- -- 100.0 -
Total N 326 144 319 172 171 109 816 425
% 69.4 30.6 65.0 35.0 61.1 38.9 65.8 34.2
for local SOE subsidiaries. Leaders closer to the top of the subsidiary 
chain are also more likely to have this experience.
We track leaders each time their position changes, according to six 
categories:
1) Demotion: movement to a lower level enterprise (including from 
a parent to a subsidiary), movement from a leadership position to 
become an ordinary board member or deputy-leader in the same 
SOE subsidiary, or another SOE subsidiary of the same rank.
2) At level: moving to another SOE subsidiary at the same administra-
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tive level or returning to a previously held position.
3) Promotion: movement to a leadership position in a higher-level enter-
prise (including from a subsidiary company to a parent, or where the 
new SOE-subsidiary is clearly of a higher administrative rank), promo-
tion within the same company (for example, from general manager to 
Chairman of Board), or appointment to a government position.
4) Retirement: due to age, illness, criminal investigation or discipline 
inspection.
5) Movement to a non-state owned enterprise: to, for example, a private 
business.
6) Unknown.
Table 4 shows 395 (31.8 per cent) leadership promotions. We note that 
leaders of 'directly controlled' are slightly less likely to be promoted. 
Transfer at level occurred 22.8 per cent of the time, and leaders were 
demoted 22.0 per cent of time. Likelihood of demotion increases for 
provincial- and county- level SOEs. The rate of retirement due to age or 
TABLE 4. Career outcomes for state-controlled listed company 
leaders
Central Provincial County
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Total
Promotion
N 40 120 91 62 64 18 395
% 3.22 9.67 7.33 5 5.16 1.45 31.83
At level
N 43 83 79 37 32 9 283
% 3.46 6.69 6.37 2.98 2.58 0.73 22.8
Demotion
N 19 65 75 34 60 20 273
% 1.53 5.24 6.04 2.74 4.83 1.61 22
Retirement 
or illness
N 19 20 42 10 13 5 109
% 1.53 1.61 3.38 0.81 1.05 0.4 8.78
Private or 
NGO
N 5 14 10 5 16 2 52
% 0.4 1.13 0.81 0.4 1.29 0.16 4.19
Unknown
N 10 32 33 13 31 10 129
% 0.81 2.58 2.66 1.05 2.5 0.81 10.39
Total
N 136 334 330 161 216 64 1241
% 10.96 26.91 26.59 12.97 17.41 5.16 100
illness is more than double for directly controlled enterprises compared 
to indirectly controlled enterprises. 
A key ﬁnding is that the leader of a listed SOE subsidiary is almost 
twice as likely to retire as they are to leave the state sector. 7.4 per cent 
of leaders in directly controlled county-SOE subsidiaries leave for the 
private sector. Some of the 'unknowns' may belong to this category. 
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Table 5 shows that out of the 395 leaders who were promoted, 81 
(20.5 per cent) were appointed to government positions. At the central 
level, only 6.9 per cent of listed central leaders were appointed to govern-
ment positions during this time, with appointment to government more 
likely from a second-tier company. These ﬁgures may be an underesti-
mate, if progression to the SOE parent is a 'stepping stone' to a govern-
ment position. Transfer to government positions are much more likely 
at local levels, particularly amongst county SOE subsidiaries, in which 
almost half of leader promotions were to government positions.
TABLE 5. Promotion to government positions
Chain
Local
Central Provincial County Total
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Direct
(0,2] N 35 5 65 26 35 29 135 60
% 87.5 12.5 71.4 28.6 54.7 45.3 69.2 30.8
Indirect
[3,6] N 111 6 56 6 9 9 176 21
% 94.9 5.1 90.3 9.7 50.0 50.0 56.1 25.9
(6,9] N 3 -- -- -- -- -- 3 0
% 100.0 -- -- -- -- -- 100.0 -
Total N 149 11 121 32 44 38 314 81
% 93.1 6.9 79.1 20.9 53.7 46.3 79.5 20.5
Performance Versus Political Connections for Promotion
We construct a logit model to explore the relationship between promo-
tion prospects, company performance and the leader's political connec-
tions, while controlling for other relevant factors. We employ a logit 
model taking the form: 
Where
Promotion (dummy) -1 = demotion, 0 = transfer at level, 1 = promotion.
Perf proﬁt divided by total assets (%)
Politician
(dummy, avg 0.34) 1 =  leader has political or administrative 
experience, 0 = otherwise. 
Education
(dummy, avg 0.51) 1 = leader has a masters' degree or PhD, 0 = 
otherwise
Age19 (range 29-69, average 48)
Tenure20
number of years the leader served in current position, (average 
4.21)
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We present the results in Table 6. We ﬁnd that administrative/politi-
cal connections are associated with increased promotion prospects, but 
we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effect for higher ﬁnancial performance. 
Longer tenure and belonging to a central SOE group are associated with 
better promotion prospects, while age is a negative. In aggregate, this 
supports the proposition that political connectedness and patronage 
relationships, rather than ﬁnancial performance, is important in SOE 
subsidiaries. However, breaking the group down into direct and indirect 
subsidiaries of central and local SOEs provides a richer story.
The 'central direct' group (column 2) includes the direct, listed sub-
sidiaries of central SOEs, whose leadership was studied directly by Yang 
et al (2013). In contrast to their ﬁndings, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant 
impact of performance, political connections or education in this group. 
The leader's length of tenure appears to be the only signiﬁcant and posi-
tive predictor of promotion. At the highest level of directly controlled 
subsidiaries, there is another 'X factor' – perhaps documented in their 
personnel dossier − that determines their promotion prospects. 
The proposition that economic performance matters more as a factor 
for promotion at lower levels of government (Choi 2012; Landry, Lü & 
Duan 2014) may apply to lower level subsidiaries of central SOEs (see 
column 2). Indeed, this is the only group of companies for which ﬁrm 
proﬁtability and the leader's education credentials are positively and 
signiﬁcantly associated with promotion. Surprisingly, administrative/
political connections appear to be a signiﬁcant negative for this group. 
These 'central indirect' SOE subsidiaries are the most 'business like' of 
all the groups.
Subsidiaries of local SOEs, both direct (column 3) and indirect (column 
4) do not reﬂect this logic. For both these groups, administrative/po-
litical connections appear signiﬁcant, positive predictors of promotion. 
Level
(dummy variable) 1 = ultimate controller is SASAC at county-level 
or below, 2 = ultimate controller is provincial SASAC, 3 = ultimate 
controller is central SASAC or central government agency 
Chain distance from ultimate state controller (i.e. SASAC) (range 1-9)
Size the log of total assets of the ﬁrm
Monopoly
(dummy) 1 = industry has lowest market concentration when 
measured using Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (11.18% of ﬁrms), 
2 = industry has medium market concentration (78.63%), 3 = 
industry with highest market concentration (10.19%)
Period 1 and 
Period 2
(dummies) used for controlling the evaluation period set by 
SASAC. Period 1 = 1 if year is 2003-2005, Period 2 = 1 if year is 
2006-2009. 
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TABLE 6. Promotion prospects for central v local, direct v indirect 
state-controlled leaders
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var = Promotion = -1 (demotion), 0 at level, 1 promotion
 
full 
sample
central 
direct
central 
indirect
local 
direct
local 
indirect
Perf 0.680 1.155 1.968** -0.168 1.4
(1.25) (0.64) (1.96) (-0.18) (1.03)
Politician 0.206** -0.322 -0.441*** 0.482*** 0.634***
(2.41) (-1.25) (-2.73) (3.46) (3.22)
Edu 0.134 0.071 0.710*** -0.249* 0.399**
(1.57) (0.25) (4.35) (-1.90) (2.01)
Age -0.032*** -0.075*** -0.0170 -0.040*** -0.0130
(-4.37) (-3.18) (-1.13) (-3.72) (-0.72)
Tenure 0.039** 0.236*** -0.052 0.063** 0.012
(2.10) (3.92) (-1.55) (2.23) (0.25)
Level 0.129**
(2.17)
Size 0.075** 0.185** 0.0560 0.0670 0.153*
(2.44) (2.48) (0.91) (1.24) (1.78)
Mono 0.0820 0.118 -0.374*** 0.298** 0.363*
(1.01) (0.31) (-2.59) (2.21) (1.80)
Chain 0.0360 —— 0.182** -0.306 0.401
(0.76) —— (2.14) (-1.08) (1.40)
period1 0.204** 0.488 0.158 0.186 0.307
(1.98) (1.44) (0.74) (1.21) (1.23)
period2 0.223** 0.625* -0.0860 0.462*** 0.0820
(2.05) (1.78) (-0.39) (2.82) (0.32)
cut1_cons 0.0620 0.316 -1.038 -0.759 4.276*
(0.08) (0.16) (-0.70) (-0.55) (1.89)
cut2_cons 1.388* 2.154 0.687 0.367 5.546**
(1.84) (1.11) (0.47) -0.27 (2.45)
N 2301 238 620 1008 435
Chi2 66.12*** 32.4*** 50.16*** 36.23*** 30.39***
Notes: (1) ***, **, *represents statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; (2) 
t-values are reported in parentheses.  Unit is person-years.
This may be because a greater proportion of promotions from local SOE 
subsidiaries are to government positions rather than to positions higher 
up the corporate pyramid.
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This appears to contradict the proposition that economic performance 
matters more at lower level of government, but it may in fact reﬂect 
a tighter connection between provincial governments and provincial 
SOEs than might exist between central government ministries and cen-
tral SOEs. In the case that the local Party secretary is incentivized with 
economic performance, it could be that provincial SOEs are more likely 
to act as a policy arm of the province, possibly supporting particular 
projects or investments that is costly to the enterprise but has a spillo-
ver beneﬁt to the province.  Conversely, if they are big local employers 
or investors, then SOE connections to local governments could soften 
their budget constraint a little in the case of distress. This should reduce 
enterprise efﬁciency.
A common characteristic for both central and local 'direct' SOE groups 
is that age is a signiﬁcant negative factor, and tenure is a signiﬁcant posi-
tive factor affecting promotion. This likely reﬂects that leaders of these 
subsidiaries higher up the chain are likely to be older, and therefore 
facing retirement age.  Neither age nor tenure are signiﬁcant predictors 
of promotion for leaders of indirect SOEs.
Conclusion: Drivers of or Obstacles to Reform?
In this article we have developed the concept of an 'iron triangle' be-
tween the Chinese state, Party and business by mapping out some of 
the connections between state and business, and between business and 
Party. We have observed that leaders of state-owned enterprises and 
their publicly-listed subsidiaries form potential members of larger Party-
based career structures. We conclude that SOEs leaders are well and truly 
part of the 'iron triangle', rather than professional business executives 
who just happen to be working for state-controlled enterprises. For this 
reason, we would expect them to act as obstacles to reforms that would 
separate business further from Party inﬂuence.
Leaders of SOEs do appear to be 'quasi ofﬁcials', or at least 'state 
businessmen' rather than professional managers. In both SOEs and their 
publicly-listed subsidiaries, administrative experience or political con-
nections appear to matter to get promotions. Based on new empirical 
analysis of leaders of listed SOEs, we show that more than a third have 
prior administrative experience or concurrent political roles. We ﬁnd 
that almost one-ﬁfth of leaders of county-level SOE subsidiaries, and 
almost one-tenth of leaders of provincial-level SOE subsidiaries, are 
promoted into government positions. We also observe that a leader of 
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a listed SOE-subsidiary is twice as likely to retire as they are to enter 
private sector employment.
However, the governance structure does appear to make a difference. 
In the case of the subsidiaries of central SOE subsidiaries, we observe 
that leaders are promoted on the basis of ﬁnancial performance. These 
are the largest, so offer the largest scope for promotion within a single 
conglomerate, as well as being amongst the most internationalized of 
SOEs. This stream feeds into the top leadership of central SOEs, which 
may be closer to the political rather than business realm. 
One next step is to see whether these apparently different manage-
ment incentives actually ﬂow through to ﬁnancial performance. Our 
ﬁndings would suggest that we should observe a difference in perform-
ance between subsidiaries of central and local SOEs. Other things being 
equal, the career incentives in favour of ﬁnancial performance for distant 
subsidiaries of central SOEs should result in higher performance for 
them, relative to local SOE subsidiaries.
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NOTES
1  Thanks to Chris McNally and other participants at the 'China: Wealth and Power' 
conference, held at the Australian National University, 7-8 April 2016 for valuable 
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.
2  Communist Party of China 2013. 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua 
gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding' ( Decision of the CPC Central Commit-
tee on Some Major Questions Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform). 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm. Accessed 12 
June 2017. 
3  According to Zhang Yi, former head of SASAC, central SOEs account for 70 per 
cent of Chinese non-ﬁnancial investment abroad. http://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/927974.shtml
4  Cummine, Angela 2015. 'China's Sovereign Investment Funds in International 
_________________________________________________________________________73
______________________ China's SOE Executives: Drivers of or Obstacles to Reform?
Perspectives: The Exceptionalism of CIC and SAFE'. EABER Working Paper Series. 
http://www.eaber.org/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/EABER%20Working%20p
aper%20110%20Cummine.pdf. (Accessed 12 June 2017).
5  Landry, Pierre F., Xiaobo Lü, and Haiyan Duan 2014. 'Does Performance Matter? 
Evaluating the Institution of Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative 
Ladder.' Forthcoming at Comparative Political Studies. Available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2452482. (Accessed 15 June 2016).
6  More details on ofﬁcial registration categories, and detailed statistics for industrial-
sector SOEs are presented in Hubbard (2016b).
7  Xinhua  2013. 'Full Text of Constitution of Communist Party of China.' Available 
at http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188095.html. (Accessed 15 
June 2017).
8  Communist Party of China  2015. 'Zhonggong zhongyan, guowuyuan guanyu 
shenhua guoyou qiye gaige de zhidao yidian' (Guiding Opinions on Deepening the 
Reform of State-Owned Enterprises). http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/
content_2930440.htm. (Accessed 12 June 2017).
9  See Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting (Ofﬁce of the Central Committee) 2000. 
'Shenhua ganbu renshi zhidu gaige gangyao' (The Plan for Deepening the Personnel 
Management System for Cadres). http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71
382/71480/4854070.html.
10  Suo, Hanxue 2014. 'Guozi gaogan diaoyuan: chao 99% bu yuan fangqi xingzheng jibie 
huan gao xin' (A Survey on SOE Heads: 99% Unwilling to Give up Administrative 
Ranking for Higher Salary). Zhongguo Jingying Bao (China Business Journal), August 
30.  Available at http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/china/20140830/003920165299.shtml. 
(Accessed 12 June 2017).
11  http://en.cosco.com/art/2013/4/15/art_765_35373.html
12  (that is, resources, manufacturing, and public utilities)
13  Rooker, Tyler 2016a. 'Zhongguo huagong jituan shangshi gongsi' (ChemChina Listed 
Companies).  Rooker Consulting. http://www.rookerconsulting.com/china-consult-
ing-weibo/chemchina-listed-companies. (Accessed 1 June 2016).
14  Rooker, Tyler 2016b. 'Bright Foods Group, Global Equity Structure -  Rooker Con-
sulting.' http://www.rookerconsulting.com/china-consulting-weibo/bright-foods-
group-global-equity-structure. (Accessed 1 June 2016).
15  Xinhua 2012. 'Communist Party Expands Presence in Thriving Private Sector.' May 25. 
Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/25/c_123187458.
htm. (Accessed 1 June 2016). 
16  Hawes, Colin 2007. 'Interpreting the PRC Company Law through the Lens of Chinese 
Political and Corporate Culture.' UNSW Law Journal 30 (3): 813–23. http://www.
unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/ﬁles/47_hawes_2007.pdf. (Accessed 
15 June 2017).
17  This coincides with the creation of SASAC in 2003, when the current system for 
appointing SOE leaders was introduced, and ends in end of the Hu Jintao adminis-
tration in 2012. Companies that close or become wholly private owned in the period 
are excluded.
18  Zhongming, Cheng. 2010. 'Government Intervention, Pyramidal Structure and In-
vestment of Local State-Owned Firms: Empirical Evidence From Chinese Capital 
Market.' IEE Xplore.  Available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5661174/
?reload=true. (Accessed 15 June 2017).
19  Unlike Zhang et al (2015) we do not include an additional dummy variable for age 
exceeding 60 years. This provides a better ﬁt for our model.
20  Unlike Zhang et al (2015) we do not include tenure squared as an additional con-
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trol. As Cao Zhunfang et al (2014) demonstrate, the leader's tenure and enterprise 
investment behaviour has a non-linear relationship (an invested U shape). In order 
to avoid this correlation we omit tenure squared.
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